After the fifth (or sixth) crash of the day, I got fed up and rolled my video drivers back to the previous version. This only took two reboots, a great improvement on the old days.
And since then: No crashes. Use the little scrolly wheel: No freeziness. No black screen of deathness. No BIOS screen at exactly the moment you least want to see it-ness.
Not the mousie, then. Or so it would seem. Or so it would appear to seem. Well, this new and exciting non-crashiness continues tomorrow, I might just see my way to purchasing a small selection of cheesy comestibles.
On the other hand: It went from a crash every two or three days, to more-or-less daily crashes, to two, three, four a day, to four times in three hours. Looks awfully like a case of
to me.
Oh, yes. It means:
Not many blogs would use it as the title of a post. Not many blogs would have a post titled:
either. Maybe "Damn You"
.
(also known as Grimm's Law, after the Brothers who discovered it**).
Remember, Chomsky was first a linguist.
There's only one place on the web where all this is gathered into... Uh, one place. And that place is
. Your host, Marc Miyake. If you're looking to stretch your blogroll a little, you'd be hard pressed to find a better direction to stretch it in than this.
So while I was messing about with Faith (the server in the previous story), I decided that since I had only a W.A.G. as to what was wrong, I would set up another server to take over FTP just in case I couldn't fix it quickly enough.
So I fired up the box that I think used to be called Amelia (though it might have been Lina, since the two are identical twins) and started loading up Fedora. I called the new box Glory.*
And about mid-way through the first install disk it folded up and died.
I rebooted, started into the install, and SPLAT!!! with a CRC** error.
And again.
I checked all the cables. I checked the power supply. I checked the CPU fan. Um, shouldn't that be, like, spinning?
and all the Chemical Rubber Tree plants were banished for good. Er, the installed proceeded smoothly.
Since it was Friday afternoon, I left it at that. After all, the box was working fine, it just wasn't fully patched.
Fast forward to Monday morning and an irate phone call. It seems that files that normally arrive via FTP aren't, and people who can normally log in using FTP can't.
So I log in using SSH (which works fine) and sure enough, FTP is rejecting my login. Also everyone else's logins. Also a new login I set up just to test it.
Strange.
I restart the FTP server. No difference.
I check the config file and fiddle a little. No difference.
I download the latest source and compile and install a new copy of the FTP server. No difference.
FTP server. No difference.
Now hang on just a minute there. The two FTP servers share no parameters, no config files, no directories. And they reject all logins, but they
ask for a password. So it's an authentication issue.
Linux offers something called PAM: pluggable authentication modules. Basically it's a centralised mechanism for checking usernames and passwords and other such stuff. And both of the FTP servers rely on PAM to check logins.
So, I float a hypothesis: I know up2date was trying to update the kernel. I know that it didn't finish doing this. I know from the log files that the server rebooted over the weekend - possibly due to a power glitch, since it's not on a UPS. (Yeah, yeah.) So maybe up2date had gotten far enough in to mess up PAM but not far enough in to actually make it all work again. So if I download and install the kernel manually, it will say:
What it really means is that you have to update to the very latest version of bash before updating the kernel. Yes, that seems strange to me too, but what do I know?
So I update bash, and I update the kernel, and I reboot, and it works! It works it works it works!
idea how I would have proceeded if that hadn't fixed the problem.
It would appear to be the video driver, and not the mousie after all.
It's sort of a developer's diary, and will morph into a documentation and support site once Minx is up and running. If you're interested in shaping the feature set of Minx - or even in contributing, since Minx will be released as open source - drop by and have a look.
. I am also planning a small
library to allow easy access to Minx functions for all the PHP coders out there (though this may not be ready for the initial release). Minx will also support access via XML-RPC, and that
be in the initial release.
database, and won't support SQL. This may change in the future - I would like to support SQL, but I haven't done any planning for that yet. If you are after remote access to the Minx database (rather than plugging Minx into an existing SQL database), there is a
available for Metakit.
Minx will initially be delivered on Linux, but it should work on Windows as well (and I hope to have a chance to test this before release) and any version of Unix. Since that now includes everything from MacOS X to OS/390, the only platforms likely to have a problem are OS/400 and the Nintendo Gamecube.
To run Minx you will need Python 2.3 or later, Metakit, and (optional but recommended) the
. Also you will need either the Apache web server (or another web server that supports Apache SSI tags) or PHP.
I will put a more detailed version of this post up on the Minx blog shortly.
I bought the box set.
Not that it's out in Australia. It's only available, as far as I know, in Region 1. Of course, that just means that I can walk into the shop and buy it just like a Region 4 DVD, and take it home and play it just like a Region 4 DVD, except that...
Except that nothing. Tell me why they're bothering with this again?
If you haven't studied philosophy, you may not have run into this concept. I'll explain what it is by first describing its counterpart,
.
The basic concept of materialism is very simple, and it is this: The universe exists. Got that? Well, that's all it is, really. The universe exists, and we exist within it. Living creatures are made up of the same fundamental particles as stars and planets and comets and so on; our brains are made up of the same sort of molecules as our bodies, and we use those brains to observe the universe and try to make some sense of it.
Now, idealism says exactly the opposite: The universe does not exist of itself, but is merely an artifact of mind. It is our perceptions that are the fundamental reality, and matter has no existence independent of perception.
Yes, I know. You don't have to tell me, I
. Until a year or so ago, I thought that the entire concept of idealism was just a game thought up by philosophers to tease first-year philosophy students... But it's not. There are people who really believe this.
which says that mind and matter exist independently of each other and have nothing at all in common (and that the mind is fundamentally inexplicable by scientific method, since it cannot be directly measured or even detected)... But somehow interact. But everybody ignores the dualists.)
. If the universe exists, there's not much you can do about it. It exists, you are part of it, and you need to deal with the universe the way it is. The most successful example of this is
, which adds a second basic concept: The universe exists, and it works in a consistent manner. The whole aim of science is to find out just what that consistent manner
.
Now, if you are an idealist, you will tend to work in the opposite direction: Mind exists, and the universe is the perceptions of that mind. Which means that the universe should work the way we think it does... Rather than the way it actually
.
Which is why very few cavemen were idealists. They died out rather quickly. It takes a robust and peaceful civilisation to support concepts that far out of whack with reality.
Den Beste also ties idealism to socialism. The link is not direct, but it is there, and it has strengthened rather than weakened over time. In the 19th century, socialism could be viewed as an interesting if untested hypothesis in social theory. It has since been tested - and has failed. So to be a supporter of socialism today necessarily brings one close to the idealist philosophy:
So it should be no surprise that many of the proponents of idealist philosophy with whom I have, shall we say, debated, are also socialists.
The really telling example, as Den Beste shows, is the comparison of the two great revolutions of the late 18th century, the American and the French. The American revolution, led by realists (if not necessarily pure materialists) founded a nation that is still growing with the same basic social structure two centuries later. The French revolution, led by idealists, turned to oppression and carnage and failed utterly within 15 years. The romanticised view of the French revolution common today hides the fact that the two revolutions really had nothing in common except a desire to be rid of an annoying king.
It's the same realists who are running America today, and it's the same idealists who are running much of Europe. That's where the fundamental divide comes from: America sees the world as it is; Europe sees the world as it should be. And if we weren't, materialists and idealists alike, under threat from the third philosophy of militant religion, that wouldn't matter. All it would mean is that at some point, France would need to increase the working week and reduce the pension so the books would balance.
But we do live in a world where we are under such a threat, and if the Europeans, still chasing their failed ideas, try to obstruct the actions undertaken by the realists to defend both groups, that is indeed a problem. And it is why those who claim that the Bush government's failure at diplomacy squandered international support are so completely wrong: There never
such support, not in France or Germany, not among the left. Because they live in the world of ideas, of what should be, not what is. Sympathy there may have been; support, never.
.
1
"Which is why very few cavemen were idealists."
That sums it up nicely.
Posted by: iMorpheus at January 07, 2004 03:33 AM (7l8u/)
2
This is a terrific post--you need to send it to the Carnival of the Vanities (as a show of munu solidarity for next week's host if for no other reason...)
Posted by: Susie at January 07, 2004 03:38 AM (0+cMc)
3
I'd say that you have it exactly backwards. The actual cavemen (IE, the Late Ice Age Cro-Magnon cave-wall tagging team who hung out in southern French caves for a couple millenia) seem to have been idealists, in the sense that they believed in a spiritual continuum which influenced, and, perhaps, dictated reality. The shaman went off to his ritual cave, and meditated with the spirits of the animals via paintings so that his tribe could hunt them better.
I think you're confusing Hume's idealism (in which the real world doesn't exist) with garden-variety idealism, in which the perceived reality is simply a product of the ideal world - Plato/Socrates' proverbial shadows on the cave wall. The divine ideal is the unseen sun, and its rays cast shadows against the cave wall, which the cave-dwellers see, and mistake for the thing itself. Hume takes this to an extreme by arguing that the sun doesn't have to exist, that maybe there isn't a rock, but only your perception of the rock. Dr. Johnson famously rebutted this argument by threatening to brain Hume with said rock.
This common sort of idealism goes back at least to Plato in a codified form, but I would argue that it's by and large the default setting of humanity. Almost all religions, from animism to Mormonism, have some component of common idealism - the belief in a divine essence, and profane emanations from that essence.
But you can't drive out idealism, and say you'll only have empiricism in your intellectual world. As much progress has been driven by idealistic invention as by empiric discovery. Orbital mechanics were discovered by empirical study, but the Newtonian laws were derived by idealistic invention. Those laws were later disproven in part by further empirical study, but the Einsteinian replacement is itself an idealistic construct. Progress is driven by a sort of three-legged race of empirical destruction of idealistic invention. I suppose this is just another way of thinking about Hegel's dialectic.
Posted by: Mitch H. at January 07, 2004 04:00 AM (tVSJJ)
4
Pixy Misa: A new bookmark in my folder with thanks to Den Beste, your site seems promising.
Mitch: Perhaps you are mistaking the empiricists' theorization from observation for philosophical idealism. Just because one engages in thinking outside an observational engagement with the material world, it doesn't always mean that you are an idealist. It's when it is done exclusively that this identifies idealism.
Posted by: Dennis at January 07, 2004 04:15 AM (/78nC)
5
Mitch -
Yes, I am talking about Berkeley's idealism here more than Plato's. (It was against Berkeley that Johnson made his statement of "I refute it thus", by the way. I thought Hume was skeptical of idealism, but it's been a long time since I read anything about, much less by, Hume.)
While you are right that there is a significant difference between the concept of the Platonic Ideal and Berkeley's Idealism, both are basically the idea that the universe is not the true reality.
As for the poor bloody cavemen: A throwaway line. Though from what we can tell, cavemen were a mix of empiricists (Are these berries good to eat? Let Og try them...) and idealists (the animism you note). They certainly weren't Berkelian Idealists, though.
We can safely ignore Berkelian Idealism, because it is simply not a useful hypothesis. It is not testable; it has no predictive power. It is, frankly, nonsense. The idealism you refer to as giving rise to Newton and Einstein is simply part of scientific materialism, and owes little to Plato and nothing at all to Berkeley.
I'd agree with you that some form of idealism seems to be the default setting for humans, and I'd suggest that this is because it is simple less effort to think that way. It doesn't make it any more valid, of course.
And a pox on Hegel's dialectic, in any case.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 07, 2004 04:21 AM (jtW2s)
6
Dennis -
Thanks. My site is full of promise, but the actual delivery is pretty hit-and-miss.
Oh well.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 07, 2004 04:22 AM (jtW2s)
7
It would be so much easier if we had more precise WORDS for these concepts. Unfortunately, if someone were to come up with economical, easily understood words for these two world-views, the idealists would probably attempt to corrupt them ASAP so as to obfuscate the fact that 'idealism' doesn't work.
I think it was Schumpter who said: "The first thing a man will do for his ideals is lie."
When you are pursuing Perfect Good and Ultimate Truth, telling little white lies is perfectly acceptable.
One can almost imagine the universe as Bugs Bunny asking: "Ain't I a little stinker, though?"
Perhaps God created irony so as to keep life from getting boring.
Posted by: Dean at January 07, 2004 05:48 AM (dN48d)
8
I, like Dennis, am here because of Den Beste's referral. I've liked what I've seen so far very much! I hope you don't mind if I hang out for a little while.
Let me offer one obervation to the micro-controversy in re "cavemen" -- the fact that they used shamen, believed in prayers for rain, etc., does not imply that they were idealists (as we've been using the term in this discussion).
As Larry Niven once pointed out, you use the science you have. Animism and shamanism had not yet been disproved, and sometimes seemed to produce results, so the cavemen followed it. (Let's also cut them some slack, given that the scientific method had yet to be codified!)
Was the 19th century unscientific by modern standards, given this silly tendency to measure personalities via bumps on the head? On the contrary. They were using the tools they had, which had not yet been discredited. Nor was Newton unscientific for failing to anticipate Einstein; same deal.
So, Pixy Misa, if you want to argue that the cavemen -- cave-paintings and all -- really WERE hard-headed pragmatists, you'd have my vote, for whatever it might be worth.
(If you're wondering about Niven, by the way, I believe he was discussing Dante's INFERNO, and making a case for it being the first ever science-fiction trilogy. Sure, it's based on astrology and mythology, not science as WE know it. But to Dante, astrology and mythology WERE science, as best as could be known at the time.)
best wishes,
Daniel in Medford
Posted by: Daniel in Medford at January 07, 2004 06:08 AM (ETuqd)
9
Berkeley? Really? Whoops. I've always been weakest on the Scottish philosophers...
Still and all, I suppose I ought to extend that by pointing out that the totalitarian thinkers aren't generally influenced by Berkeleyan idealism - they tend to be Platonists and Romantics, or worse, a heretical mix of both. Classic Marxism is essentially Platonic idealism with economic pretentions, and post-90s Marxist sects - the Anarchists, the Fascists, Communists, etc - are varying blends of anti-rationalism and Platonism.
Explaining the true totalitarian movements solely by rational catagorization is to miss the point of the influence of the anti-rationality of Romanticism. Berman and that whole school of thought holds that the Islamists are just the surviving strand of the Romantic totalitarian tendency.
Eh, I think I'm rambling...
Posted by: Mitch H. at January 07, 2004 06:51 AM (tVSJJ)
10
"...I thought the entire concept of idealism was just a game thought up by philosophers to tease first year philosophy students..."
Reminds me of the line from a Steve Taylor song:
"Freshmen scream in a classroom
was there a sound?"
I googled the lyrics:
http://www.renc.igs.net/~adt/qrstuv/songs/ip1990/track03.html
Posted by: Stephen Gordon at January 07, 2004 07:42 AM (/uOqY)
11
Seems to me (to be) a simpler explanation applies for philosophy. In ancient times people with no collected knowledge of the physical world made up myths to explain the strange things they saw happening around them. The sun crossed the sky during the day not because the earth revolves around it but because The sun-god sails around the world in his boat each day (people noticed a long time ago that daylight happened at different times in different parts of the world) and soforth.
We still don't have any knowledge to speak of concerning the internal workings of the brain, and therefore have no proof that the mind is a product of the body it inhabits. We *know* it, most of us, but we can't supply a pat explanation in a textbook. So we make up myths like idealism, dualism, etc. to fill in the gaps -and then to top it off we set a goal of not only explaining a system we have little knowledge of, but doing it using not math or science but spoken and written human language. It's man's enduring mental weakness -we can't deal with the idea that we just don't know something.
Anyway, just came to your blog from Den Beste, who I read regularly. I'll be checking back :-)
Posted by: Stacy at January 07, 2004 08:19 AM (ikdVG)
12
I came over here from a comment you left on 'Semi-intelligent Thought' to encourage you to expand on the idea of the 'Type M' (motivation) vs 'Type C' (consequences) idea. Having read this post, I'd like to also like to ask if you see a correlation between those and the materialist/idealist dichotomy. I certainly do.
(Oh, and you are on my blogroll already. I'd have found this post anyway but probably wouldn't have linked it to that comment.)
Posted by: Kathy K at January 07, 2004 11:23 AM (JjVFN)
13
Unfortunately, Den Beste makes some absurdly reductionist claims. First, Plato's idealism was not about denying an "objective" reality. Quite the contrary, he argued that all ideas and concepts were defined by forms which have an existence external to consciousness. Plato was all about objective truth, but, quite rightly, Aristotle criticized him for providing no real way of determining it. Furthermore, Aristotle, his justifications for slavery notwithstanding, was oriented to searching empirically to advance knowledge. He spent a great deal of time criticizing Plato's overly "elegant" conceptions of justice and the like.
Contrary to the accounts here and on USS Clueless, so-called "realism" did not suddenly enter the limelight with the Enlightenment. Empirical methods tracing their lineage in Europe and the Middle East back to Aristotle and the Greek mathematicians have an ancient history. How else, after all, did the Romans built their plumbing systems? Consider further the sophisticated engineering required for mediaeval siege weaponry or bridges. Also, non-Western civilizations were equally adept at invention.
Furthermore, American revolutionaries were not "realists or pragmatists" - Locke's view of human nature was incredibly idealist. If you want a realist philosopher, look at Hobbes. As for Rousseau, while he was no doubt an idealist, his thought is equally part of the liberal tradition. That his work has both radically democratic and totalitarian tendencies is more evidence of conflicting forces of civic identity and nationalism and his goal of liberating individuals of their "chains" (And, yes, Marx stole that from him). However, he was little more egalitarian than early American revolutionaries.
Fundamentally, "realism" or "empiricism" depends on the reliability of the scientific method, and while these work fairly well for natural sciences, in human affairs, they do not. Human beings cannot be studied with the same level of detail or detachedness as can be species of algae. There are severe *practical* problems with studying human social relations.
Moreover, empiricism is even limited in the natural sciences; consider the Uncertainty Principle, where the very act of observing a particle changes its energy state. There *is* something to be said for the claim that experience determines reality after all.
Posted by: Josh at January 07, 2004 01:59 PM (ehJUl)
14
I never suggested that empiricism began with the Enlightenment, and you are quite right that its history began with the ancient Greeks (as did many valuable ideas). I agree with your comments regarding Aristotle. But Plato did indeed deny that the universe was the true reality, claiming instead that it was a projection (a "shadow") of some imperceptible ideal. Which is of a class with Berkeley's idealism (which is what I was discussing) but not the same thing.
Where you talk about an idealist view of human nature, that's an entirely different definition of idealism. Den Beste also points out the difficulty of the terms idealism and realism, which have specific meanings in the philosphical jargon that don't really connect with their everyday usage. What he and I are talking about is an idealist view of the material world.
To address your points on the scientific method: The problem with social sciences is purely one of complexity. The scientific method is just as valuable and valid here as elsewhere; it's just that the problems are very much harder. And you are very limited in the scope of experiments you can run and on the controls you can apply, for practical and ethical reasons.
Your comment regarding the Uncertainty Principle, though, is simply false. The Uncertainty Principle in no way limits or invalidates the usefulness of empiricism. On the contrary, the Uncertainty Principle can be and has been empirically verified. There is little to be said for the claim that "experience determines reality" until someone can explain what they actually mean by that. Quantum Mechanics works by known and unchanging rules; it is just that certain parameters are non-deterministic. Perception has no effect on those rules whatsoever.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 07, 2004 02:36 PM (kOqZ6)
15
To quote my good friend and political idol, Darth Vader:
Impressive...
Posted by: Bill Whittle at January 07, 2004 03:19 PM (Qf8Lh)
16
Yow! Can I quote you on that?
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 07, 2004 03:53 PM (kOqZ6)
17
Well, the Uncertainty Principle was just something I threw out there for the heck of it. But back to empiricism. There's another fundamental problem with its application to social science: that of hidden normative claims which go into underlying assumptions about reality, influencing, among other things, the choice of variables. Ultimately, if we are to be analysing human affairs, we run into the problem that we are describing the experiences of others through our own experiences - scientific detachment is not possible.
Otherwise, Den Beste would be better to use the terms idealism and empiricism (or positivism) rather than a loaded term like "realism." However, it is necessary to note that the heirs of Platonic thought are not necessarily idealist in orientation - neo-Marxists tend to jettison teleology.
Lastly, there is no clear dichotomy between empiricism and idealism - consider attempts to develop a "theory of everything" in higher physics. A search for "elegance" seems to be a part of all human discovery, whether it includes an explicit teleology or not. Consider the notion of "progress."
Posted by: Josh at January 07, 2004 03:55 PM (ehJUl)
18
And here is where we fundamentally disagree - at least if you are saying scientific detachment in social science is not possible in principle. If you are just saying that scientific detachment is not possible in practise, at present - then I agree and the problem is as I said, one of complexity.
You are right that the scienctific process is not purely empirical. However, the deciding test of the value of scientific theory is always empirical. Elegance is a useful guide because it has served us well in the past, but an elegant theory that fails to match reality will always be rejected in favour of an ugly theory that works.
Though there is usually a period of bitter argument first.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 07, 2004 04:15 PM (kOqZ6)
19
It's certainly possible, but very, very limited in practice. I really want to avoid getting into a discussion of - yuck - phenomenology, so we'll leave at that.
Quite right about the problem of elegance. Einstein spent a lot of time trying to "clean up" Quantum Theory to give it "elegance," but without that much success. Anyway, my point of disagreement was about the definitions of empiricism and idealism insofar as Den Beste's article was concerned, since I felt he vastly oversimplified the issue while failing to look at the weaknesses of the former when applied to social science and philosophy. Or something. I'm tired, interesting discussion, goodnight!
Posted by: Josh at January 07, 2004 04:23 PM (ehJUl)
20
Bobby Kennedy said "Some men see what is and ask "why?"; others see what could be ask "Why not?" It might sound simplistic, but I'm guessing that that's the essence of dualism.
Maybe dualism is largely ignored by philosophers because not absolute; it seems kinda foggy. And we should dismiss it on those grounds because...?
We can't just can't pigeonhole thinkers into strict categories of "realists" and "idealists." Idealists think they're being realistic and realists think they're ideal. I think it's just a matter of whether you lean toward believing that realism is the ideal or that idealism can be real.
What the hell am I talking about? I dunno. Lemee alone.
Posted by: Tuning Spork at January 07, 2004 04:40 PM (ui/F1)
21
Well, then it appears we mostly agree. A proper discussion of all of these issues would take up a good-sized book, so any short essay is bound to have some flaws. Still, it's helpful to have such flaws pointed out, so that the argument can be strengthened.
Thanks for your insight. And as you say: yuck - phenomenology.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 07, 2004 04:44 PM (kOqZ6)
22
Hi Spork!
The problem with dualism is that it defines two entirely separate worlds, mind and matter. Yet the two, despite being entirely separate, somehow interact. When you ask how this can be, all you get is hand-waving.
I don't think that's quite what Kennedy was talking about.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 07, 2004 04:47 PM (kOqZ6)
23
Oh, and congrats on the Cluelesslanch (and having Bill Whittle post in yer Comments!).
Posted by: Tuning Spork at January 07, 2004 04:55 PM (ui/F1)
24
The problem with dualism is that it defines two entirely separate worlds, mind and matter. Yet the two, despite being entirely separate, somehow interact. When you ask how this can be, all you get is hand-waving.
The best answer to this might be Daniel Dennett's "Consciousness Explained." The mind is a material thing. No matter how gutterally we might be convinced that our thoughts are supranatural, we have to admit, at the very least, that our flightiest fancies are still obeying all eltro-chemical processeses of causality and effect.
To think that there's something spooky and *ahem* idealistic going on is just plain delusion.
imo
Posted by: Tuning Spork at January 07, 2004 05:11 PM (ui/F1)
25
ooops. Lokks like the Blockquote html doesn;t work 'round hyar ;/
Posted by: Tuning Spork at January 07, 2004 05:13 PM (ui/F1)
26
Sorry - I've been meaning to enable blockquotes... There you go.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 07, 2004 05:47 PM (kOqZ6)
27
And I agree that Dennett has the right of it here. Though we cannot fully explain the nature of consciousness, there is no evidence that it has anything other than a material basis.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 07, 2004 05:49 PM (kOqZ6)
28
You precious Love,
you flesh and blood.
O, you tangle of matter and ghost.
You guardian of angels, demons and saints
and the whole broken-hearted Host;
gentle this Soul,
gentle this Soul.
--Leonard Cohen
Posted by: Tuning Spork at January 07, 2004 07:40 PM (ui/F1)
29
"Now, idealism says exactly the opposite: The universe does not exist of itself, but is merely an artifact of mind. It is our perceptions that are the fundamental reality, and matter has no existence independent of perception."
We're painting with fairly broad brushes here, but here are some of my thoughts:
1. The standard empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) had no particular interest in science, and sought in various ways to limit its effects. Science is remarkably counter-intuitive (do you normally think of solid objects as a collection of neutrons, protons, electrons?), and the original empiricists were concerned, among other things, about how science gets us to distrust our commonsense conceptions of the world. Hence Hume's attack on causality.
2. Not all idealisms assert that the universe is "merely an artifact of the mind," at least not in the sense that the mind simply makes it all up. (In fact, I don't know of any philosopher who does say this.) What they are concerned with is the extent to which our forms of understanding help constitute the world as it is for us. Thus Kant tries to rescue causality from Hume's attack by claiming that the concept of causality is ultimately something we bring to experience, and not something that we simply learn from experience. In other words, if our mind wasn't already built to think causally, we wouldn't have a coherent experience to begin with. This doesn't mean that "the universe should work the way we think it does" rather than how it really is.
3. Marx was a materialist and considered himself to be working within modern science. Indeed, the socialists and communists have always been inspired by the thought of regulating the human world through an understanding grounded in science. They too considered themselves realists against the provincials who actually believed in God and the notion that human beings are significantly different from other animals.
4. I'm trying not to come across as stuffy, but I honestly don't think you've spent a great deal of time with any of the thinkers you are talking about. Nor, as far as I can tell, has Den Beste, although I greatly appreciate his writings in other areas. It is easy to be dismissive, but impossible to be dismissive and understand.
Posted by: Eddie Thomas at January 07, 2004 11:00 PM (E64MO)
30
To take your points in order.
1. Yes, and the philosphers are wrong, and the scientists are right. However counter-intuitive modern physics may be, it is right, and we know this because it works.
2. Yes, I was targeting Berkeley and that crowd in particular, rather than (for example) Plato. But Berkeley does indeed claim that the universe is an artifact of mind (not of individual human minds, but of some esoteric all-encompassing invisible mind-thing). And from what I've seen of those who embrace such a belief, this does very often lead to the viewpoint that the universe behaves as we think it should. At the same time, the people found espousing that viewpoint claim that they are saying nothing of the sort... Even when their own words show that they are. This is very annoying.
3. Yes, it is arguable that Marx himself was a realist and a materialist. However, the same cannot be said for todays Marxists - the difference being that the theory has been tested and found wanting. Today's Marxists hold tight to the theory in the face of unpleasant fact.
4. You are right that I haven't spent a great deal of time with these thinkers: One undergraduate course, a certain amount of reading of my own, and a few rather acrimonious debates online. And I do tend to be dismissive of many of them, because they are simply so far wrong. I have respect for Plato, who was trying to understand the universe as best he could, and had few earlier philosopher to build on. (But more respect for Aristotle.) I have respect for Descartes, for example. But none at all for Berkeley, who was, frankly, full of hot air. One cannot achieve understanding while being dismissive, but once understanding is achieved, being dismissive of foolishness may be quite appropriate.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 07, 2004 11:18 PM (jtW2s)
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Having said all that, I agree that neither my article nor Den Beste's is comprehensive or unflawed. This is just a blog after all, not a doctoral dissertation, but I still welcome corrections and alternate viewpoints.
I may come back to this topic later and try to address it more fully... But these are not really the usual waters that Ambient Irony swims in.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 07, 2004 11:32 PM (jtW2s)
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"1. Yes, and the philosphers are wrong, and the scientists are right. However counter-intuitive modern physics may be, it is right, and we know this because it works."
I'm not challenging the scientists, only pointing out that the empiricists were not on their side.
"2. ...But Berkeley does indeed claim that the universe is an artifact of mind (not of individual human minds, but of some esoteric all-encompassing invisible mind-thing). And from what I've seen of those who embrace such a belief, this does very often lead to the viewpoint that the universe behaves as we think it should."
Berkeley certainly qualifies as an idealist, but he is largely a cul de sac in the history of philosophy. If you are going to be tracing the influence of idealism on things like socialism, for example, you would need to consider figures like Kant and Hegel.
Furthermore, even in Berkeley's terms, to say that the universe is an artifact of God's mind does mean that it is not simply up to us, that it doesn't conform simply to what we want it to be. I'm not sure who you've met who embraces Berkeley and takes his philosophy in that direction, but I've never seen such a position myself.
"3. Yes, it is arguable that Marx himself was a realist and a materialist. However, the same cannot be said for todays Marxists - the difference being that the theory has been tested and found wanting. Today's Marxists hold tight to the theory in the face of unpleasant fact."
Agreed, but it muddies the idealism = bad, realism = good account.
"4. ...And I do tend to be dismissive of many of them, because they are simply so far wrong."
I'm not sure what the "so far" means, but if it means "as far as I can tell at this point," that is hardly grounds to be dismissive. It might incline you not to put further time into them, given how limited one's time is anyway, but it doesn't count as a refutation either.
I hope I didn't offend. I believe that I am sympathetic to many of your concerns, but I just think you have written off some thinkers who are better than they might seem.
Posted by: Eddie Thomas at January 08, 2004 02:31 AM (NahL2)
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Eddie - You certainly haven't offended, and while I may not end up agreeing with you, you have given me some points to think over.
Interesting comment you make on Berkeley, as the last group of people I discussed the subject with practically idolised the man. This was on the JREF forums (on James Randi's website, randi.org). The idealists there generally hold other kooky notions (unshakable belief in various supernatural events being chief among these), and claim the existence of these supernatural events as evidence for the truth of (their version of) idealism, and simultaneously claim the truth of idealism as support for the existence of said supernatural events. If you are suspecting that this has coloured my views on a certain school of philosophy, you may well be right.
Kant does have his good points, but that seems to me at least partly due to his spraying out ideas in all directions. Reading Hegel invariably gives me a headache. (Which as you say is hardly a refutation - indeed, since I find it difficult to read his work I don't really have a clear idea of what the man said.)
When I said "so far wrong", I meant not "wrong, so far" but "so far from the correct answer". Again, I'm not applying this to all philosophers, but certainly to Berkeley - and we would seem to agree on that case.
Now, as to the idealism = bad, realism = good: That wasn't quite what I was trying to say. My point is, rather, realism = useful, idealism (and we're talking about philosophical idealism here, Berkeley's or Plato's or similar) = unhelpful. If, as I maintain, idealism is a poor model for the universe, then followers of idealism will tend to make poor decisions when dealing with the universe. Because they are not dealing with the universe as it is, but with an inaccurate model. My argument for materialism is that, although it is not a provable proposition, it has proven to be a very useful one.
I'm grateful to the number of people who have taken time to comment here. This was just something I rattled off after reading Den Beste's piece, and is not as carefully thought out as I would like for a post that is getting so much attention. (For me, 1200 readers in a day is rather a lot.) I think there is indeed something real here, but this post as it is does not do the topic justice.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 08, 2004 02:57 AM (jtW2s)
34
In recent reading about Kant, I've picked up a distinction between "absolute idealism" and "transcendental idealism". Berkeley's idealism is of the absolute kind: everything is ultimately an idea in the mind of God. Transcendental idealism (Kant) is more epistemological: everything we know about, we know through the medium of our minds. To some extent it is perfectly compatible with neuroscientific materialism. The biggest stumbling block for modern materialists is the idea that space, time, causality, etc. exist only in the mind, and not in the outside ("noumenal") world as well. Criticisms of Kant in that vein have existed from the beginning.
Posted by: mitch at January 08, 2004 10:11 AM (myTQZ)
35
I'm not at all convinced that the idea that space, time, causality, etc. exist only in the mindactually has any meaning.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 08, 2004 11:15 AM (jtW2s)
36
Another problem with Den Beste's post: He conflates empiricism with pragmatism, calling it "realist" in orientation, which is little more than a loaded term for his own bias. First, Locke's thought was hardly bereft of teleology or normative judgements - he makes the value claim that an individual's right to life, liberty, and property is prior to the formation of societies and endowed by God. Such a state of nature claim, based on an appeal to God, can hardly be considered "empirical." We can certainly favour the values esposed by Locke, but they are neither empirical nor "pragmatist."
I also get the sense that he knows next to nothing about Rousseau, apart from his ideological association with the French Revolution. Rousseau spent a great deal of time in On the Social Contract discussing empirical political science, including a detailed description of the governance of Republican Rome and the effects on the integrity of a polity based on its size, climate, wealth, etc. He also anticipated Darwin by a century in developing an evolutionary account of the beginnings of human society. Lastly, Rousseau's principles of political right are no more teleological than Locke's: the social contract was all about ensuring and promoting freedom and the general welfare. How outrageous!
Posted by: Josh at January 08, 2004 11:46 AM (sG6/E)
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Pixy: I don't see what the problem is. If I said that God, or the boogeyman you dreamed about last night, exists only in your mind, would you have the same problem? You might have some questions about what "existing in the mind" actually means, ontologically, but I don't think you'd consider the statement meaningless. It also seems clear that space, time and causality do "exist in our minds" in some form or other - we experience things in space and time (they are "forms of sensibility"), and we experience events as causally connected (we have a concept of causality). So the question must be, do they exist only in our minds, or in the larger world as well? Even if they do exist out there, even if they necessarily do so, the original statement (of the transcendental-idealist position) isn't meaningless, it's just wrong.
Posted by: mitch at January 08, 2004 04:30 PM (myTQZ)
38
There is a mapping between the material universe and our mental picture of it, true.
But what does it mean to say that space exists only in our minds? If we assume that there is in fact a material universe, what is our concept of space a mapping of if not space? (Likewise time and causality.) It is one thing to say that the commonplace idea of space is not a good model of the real universe. It is another thing to say that matter is a consequence of mind, rather than vice versa.
But if one allows a physical universe, and then claims that the properties of that physical universe are in fact purely mental constructs, then we've left the borderlands of of wrong and set out into the realms of utter nonsense.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 08, 2004 07:44 PM (jtW2s)
39
What if perceived space and time are not a mapping of anything, but rather a structure which things get mapped into? The universe might be a structure whose constitutive relations simply aren't spatial or temporal; space and time would merely be representational formats used by the human mind. True or false, it's a coherent hypothesis.
Posted by: mitch at January 09, 2004 09:28 PM (myTQZ)
40
No, it's still a mapping. And it's a mapping of something. And there's no reason not to call that something space and time, because we know that it works like space and time.
So no, it's not a coherent hypothesis at all.
Space and time might be emergent properties rather than fundamental ones, but that doesn't mean that they don't exist. It's like saying that colour doesn't exist, because it's really just the energy level of photons, or that sound doesn't exist, because it's really just variations in air pressure.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 09, 2004 10:50 PM (jtW2s)
41
How can you tie absolute idealism to socialism? Marx himself and all the socialist/communist governments that adopted his ideas were absolute materialists.
Posted by: carl at January 10, 2004 12:40 AM (HuXYk)
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The tie is that socialists follow the theory of socialism rather than observed facts - and more than that, either deny the facts or the relevance of those facts. If you read Marc Miyake's discussion of idealism in linguistics, you'll see another view of how someone can be a metaphysical materialist with regards to the fundamental nature of the universe - but still approach it as an idealist.
As I mentioned earlier, Marx himself can be viewed as a theorist, and the earliest adopters of socialism perhaps as empiricist social experimenters - but latter-day adherents are clearly idealists.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 10, 2004 12:49 AM (jtW2s)
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Wups, you said absolute idealism. Okay, the problem is that I allowed the term to slip a little. Agreed that socialists are not (as a rule) Berkelian matter-is-mind idealists, which was where my article started. That's why I said The link is not direct, but it is there, and it has strengthened rather than weakened over time.... But that didn't properly explain that I was talking about two different variants of idealism.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 10, 2004 12:53 AM (jtW2s)
44
I'm not very "eductated" in philosophy, but here's my thought:
If the Universe exists only in the mind, then who's mind? God's? Mine? Yours? Charles Manson's? Who can tell?
Let's assume that Berkeley was correct. All I know for sure is that I exist. I don't know if you exist; you could be a figment of my imagination. I don't know if my computer exists; this crazy technology could be part of a magical dream I'm having. I don't even know for sure that 2+2=4; I've made mathematical errors before and this could be yet another. The only thing I know absolutely then is that I exist.
So, how long will I - and the Universe - exist? My experience tells me that people die.
I used to be 5 years old and drawing farm animals in kindergarten. Later, I was 12 years old and wading through the river that seperated my street from the cemetary. Later still I was 22 years old and teaching an M-60 machinegun course in the deserts of Nevada. Now I'm 40 and typing words onto Pixy Misa's blog.
I've never gotten younger, only older. Will the Universe command that I be 120 years old one day? 230? 56473821678348? If the Universe exists in my mind then it will die with my mind. All of the causality that I've witnessed would be thrown out the window and the Universe will become nonsense, ironicly, a Reality that I - in my self-constructed experience - never even knew existed.
Posted by: Tuning Spork at January 10, 2004 03:53 PM (mPmv1)
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I don't know about the rest of the world, but I think most Americans are probably dualists in a vague not-thought-about-very-often kind of way. That is, yes they believe that there is a real world made of matter and that there is also a a spiritual realm where God and souls and free will reside. If you look at the polling data, most Americans believe in some form of life after death and God but are also very literal minded about the external world.
About Bishop Berkeley;
"The universe exists"
He would have agreed with that. He did not believe that the universe was a matter of opinion, regardless of what the fruit-loops at the Amazing Randi website might say. They are either mischaracterizing what he said or, more likely, they failed to understand it.
"I do not argue against the existence of any one thing we can apprehend, either by sense or reflexion...."
"There is a rerum natura, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force."
Berkeley was an empiricist and he felt that the science of his day was creeping into metaphysics by using words such as force, attraction, and matter as though they referred to some real physical entity. He said that these are abstract concepts, associations of ideas in the human mind, that have no real physical existence.
Let's skip matter for a second and talk about force, as in the 'force of gravity'. That an object will fall to earth if you drop it is empirical observational fact. That all objects that fall to earth behave in a similar manner is also empirical observational fact. Newtonian mechanics describes these facts and has great predictive power with regard to them (on the macroscopic level). What Newton couldn't do was explain why the objects behaved as they did ("It is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact....That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance, through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else by and through which their action may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man, who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it."--Isaac Newton).
But people do fall into it;
"What makes the apple fall to earth?"
"The force of gravity."
What is the force of gravity?"
"It is what makes the apple fall to earth."
Not only does this not convey any real information (you don't know anything more about gravity than you did before) it is more or less the same as saying "the devil did it".
"What makes the apple fall to earth?"
"The Devil."
Who is the Devil?"
"The guy that makes the apple fall to earth."
Matter is the same sort of abstraction.
"What is matter?"
"It is what real things are made of."
"What are real things?"
"Things that are made of matter."
Matter is great way of classifying objects, real objects are material and imaginary ones are not, but to go beyond that and assume that matter is a real thing in the sense that an apple is a real thing is to engage in metaphysics, not science.
In other words, the apple is real, it exists--I can see it, taste it, smell it, touch it, and drop it and hear it go thunk when it hits the floor. Matter however, has no equivalent existence. Matter does not exist as such anywhere. There is no observed instance of matter existing anywhere except as some thing (a book, a table, a chair, or an apple, et cetera...), therefore, matter is not real in the same sense that the apple is real.
Berkeley would have characterized materialism as the belief that the apple is not in fact an apple, but rather a lump of this stuff called matter, that is unknown and unknowable as a thing in itself, that supports the sensory perceptions that we think of as an apple.
He thought the idea was absurd. He believed that what we perceive is what is real and that everything else is abstract metaphysical speculation.
Posted by: carl at January 12, 2004 04:00 AM (HuXYk)
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Carl - would you (or Berkeley, if you are just playing his part) then argue that apples are not real?
Matter is made up of a number of fundamental particles with known, quantified properties which are acted on in known, quantified ways by a very small and specific set of forces. Matter behaves in ways that can be precisely described mathematically.
But because the term matter is used to describe a set of objects, you can't point at some matter without pointing at something that also has another possible description.
While an apple may be different to matter in referring to a specific object, that's purely the function of the indefinite article applied to it. Apples is precisely the same as matter in this regard. The term apples is used to describe a class of objects of varying properties, just like matter. Every object in that class has its own specific description, as well as being a member of class apple.
So, we are left with one of three possible answers to Berkeley:
1. He was wrong.
2. He was making a statement about language, rather than a statement about the nature of reality (though possibly he didn't realise this).
3. His statements were meaningless.
"What is the force of gravity?"
"It is what makes the apple fall to earth."
Newton provided a mathematical description of the force of gravity. He didn't know what caused it, but he could tell you exactly how and when it worked and what was influenced by it. (Subject to later revision by Einstein, of course.)
Gravity is an attractive force acting on all material objects proportional in strength to the masses of those objects and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them.
There's a hell of a difference between what Newton actually said and your glib "It is what makes the apple fall to earth.".
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 12, 2004 11:38 AM (jtW2s)
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I feel I must point out that the only words in this sentence;
"Gravity is an attractive force acting on all material objects proportional in strength to the masses of those objects and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them."
that describe what gravity is, as opposed to what gravity does are, "Gravity is an attractive force...".
What you are saying is that gravity is an attractive force that attracts things.
Why not just say things are attracted to one another and dispense with gravity?
Similarly you can rephrase this,
"Matter is made up of a number of fundamental particles with known, quantified properties which are acted on in known, quantified ways by a very small and specific set of forces. Matter behaves in ways that can be precisely described mathematically."
to read,
"Objects are made up of a number of fundamental particles with known, quantified properties which are acted on in known, quantified ways by a very small and specific set of forces. Objects behave in ways that can be precisely described mathematically."
and dispense with matter.
What violence has been done to science?
Posted by: carl at January 12, 2004 06:07 PM (HuXYk)
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No violence has been done to science - except that it makes far less sense to say "Objects behave in ways that can be precisely described mathematically." than it does to say the same thing for matter. A cat is an object; it is absurdly difficult to preciseley describe the behaviour of a cat mathematically.
The violence has been done to language. Gravity is the name we give to how (and not just the fact that) material objects are attracted to each other.
Matter is the name we give to the stuff that makes up material objects.
Both are perfectly good and useful terms and work just fine as they are. The fact that you can't point at "matter" is irrelevant, because you can't point at "apple" either.
Which is the point I was making when I suggested that if Berkeley's statments have any meaning at all they are statements about language and not about reality.
As for your statement about the definition of gravity: You're wrong.
Saying "gravity is an attractive force" tells us only part of the story. Gravity is a force, it is attractive, it is proportional two the masses of the objects involved, it is inversely proportional to the distance between the objects.
You might just as well cut down "A carrot is an orange root vegetable that is a good source of vitamin K." to "A carrot is an orange."
As Steven Den Beste says:
For an engineer, a thing is what it does.
The same applies to scientists, and indeed to anyone who wants to do anything useful with... Well, anything.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 12, 2004 07:23 PM (jtW2s)
49
"A cat is an object; it is absurdly difficult to preciseley describe the behaviour of a cat mathematically."
If I drop a cat and a rock from an airplane at 21,000 feet, they will behave in more or less the same manner. Even when kitty is on the ground killing mice and birds its activity is governed by the same physical laws that apply to everything else.
"Gravity is the name we give to how (and not just the fact that) material objects are attracted to each other."
OK, but there is nothing in this statement,
"Gravity is a force, it is attractive, it is proportional two the masses of the objects involved, it is inversely proportional to the distance between the objects."
that tells me how this "attractive force" works. You have merely described the manner in which objects behave under the influence of gravity.
What makes you think Einstein was wrong?
His belief was that gravity is a purely geometric phenomena. Objects fall towards one another because they are following the shortest possible path (or perhaps "path of least resistance" might be a better way to phrase it) through the space/time continuum.
This adequately explains observed fact and does so without reference to any "attractive forces".
I am running short of time now, but I will post some more when I get home from work this evening.
In the meantime, have you ever heard of "luminiferous ether"?
Posted by: carl at January 13, 2004 12:43 AM (HuXYk)
50
If I drop a cat and a rock from an airplane at 21,000 feet, they will behave in more or less the same manner. Even when kitty is on the ground killing mice and birds its activity is governed by the same physical laws that apply to everything else.
And as I said before, it is absurdly difficult to preciseley describe the behaviour of a cat mathematically. Even in free fall all you have is a gross average that ignores almost all the information available.
When it's not in free fall, you've got no chance.
You have merely described the manner in which objects behave under the influence of gravity.
It is what it does. Having described the behaviour of gravity, we have described gravity.
What makes you think Einstein was wrong?
Outside of quantum mechanics, nothing. Nor did I say anything to imply that Einstein was wrong.
His belief was that gravity is a purely geometric phenomena. Objects fall towards one another because they are following the shortest possible path (or perhaps "path of least resistance" might be a better way to phrase it) through the space/time continuum.
You've left out the most critical part of Einstein's description of gravity: Mass curves space.
And the term you are after is geodesics.
Now, the important thing about Einstein's theory is not the terms used to describe gravity, but the numbers presented by the equations - which differ from the numbers we get from Newton's equations. And we find that Einstein's numbers are right (or at least, more accurate than Newton's).
This adequately explains observed fact and does so without reference to any "attractive forces".
Well, as you wrote it, even with my amendment, it is a far inferior description of gravity. With my description of Newton's theory, you can compare the description against observed fact in a mathematically precise way. Your description allows no such thing.
In the meantime, have you ever heard of "luminiferous ether"?
Yes, I've heard of the luminiferous ether. I've also heard of the Michelson-Morley experiment which showed that it doesn't exist.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 13, 2004 01:13 AM (jtW2s)
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In any case, Einstein's theory merely replaces an unexplained (but quantified) attractive force with an unexplained (but quantified) curvature of space.
As I said, the superiority of Einstein's theory is that the numbers we get from it better agree with what the Universe actually does than Newton's.
Posted by: Pixy Misa at January 13, 2004 01:18 AM (jtW2s)
52
"And as I said before, it is absurdly difficult to preciseley describe the behaviour of a cat mathematically. Even in free fall all you have is a gross average that ignores almost all the information available."
And thinking of the cat as matter instead of as an object is going to change its behavior how?
If thinking of the cat as matter doesn't change its behavior, how is it going to simplify the math?
If thinking of the cat as matter instead of as an object does not simplify the math, why bother?
In fact if you regard any falling object as just being matter and not an object that is a thing in itself and plug it into Newton's equation are you not making a "gross average that ignores almost all the information available."?
"Yes, I've heard of the luminiferous ether. I've also heard of the Michelson-Morley experiment which showed that it doesn't exist."
And the reason physicists spent untold man hours, sweat, and treasure trying to find it is because they made an assumption. That light behaves (sometimes) like waves is observational fact, it is that which is. It is not a matter of opinion. The scientists then reasoned that if light is a wave, then something, some real physical thing, must be waving. They called this the ether and then spent a hundred plus years looking for it before Einstein stood up and said, "There is no ether."
You are doing the same with regard to gravity.
"With my description of Newton's theory, you can compare the description against observed fact in a mathematically precise way. Your description allows no such thing."
I am not disputing the mathematics, I am disputing the underlying assumptions.
You assume that because objects move toward one another in a manner consistent with physical laws that there must be a "force of gravity."
But if Einstein was right about gravity being a geometric phenomena, then it makes no more sense to speak of the "force of gravity" than it does to refer to a curve in the road as "the force of left (or right)".
"It is what it does."
Let's go back to our falling feline for a second. Are you suggesting that when I throw the cat out of the airplane it has ceased to be a cat and become merely a falling object? If so, why were you so concerned about the difficulties inherent in describing feline behavior mathematically? After all, if a thing is merely what it does, then what difference is there between a falling cat and a falling rock?
Personally, I think the cat would still be a cat even after being ejected from the aircraft. A cat is what it is, and falling is what it is doing. It will not cease to be a cat until it hits the ground.
"Gravity is the name we give to how (and not just the fact that) material objects are attracted to each other."
You have yet to provide a definition of gravity that explains how it works. Are there gravitons (or is it gravitrons? one is a carnival ride and the other is an assumption, I can never remember which is which)? Are there giant magical invisible rubber bands connecting everything? Is the Devil pushing things together?
This is why "A thing is what is does" is a formula for utility, not understanding.
Posted by: carl at January 13, 2004 03:59 PM (HuXYk)
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I just wrote an almost completely generic object-oriented wrapper for Metakit records in 35 lines of Python code. Which includes 4 lines of comments, 5 blank lines and 5 lines of debugging code.
It handles searching by the primary key, creation if it's not found, and completely transparent transferral of data from the argh. Uzgbf. Never mind. Back to the drawing board.
Update: I just wrote an even more almost completely generic object-oriented blah blah, same length (well, I took out the 5 debugging lines), only this time it doesn't screw everything up when two threads try to manipulate the same record.
I call it MEOW: The Metakit Easy Object Wrapper. Hooray for getattr, setattr and hasattr! I've never tinkered with Python objects like this before, but after only a couple of hours it all makes sense. In fact, it's obvious that this is how to do it. (Actually, there's probably an even simpler way that I have yet to find, but pfft. This is neat and understandable, very general, fast enough, and works.)
A little more tweaking and I'll have a base class that I can derive all my objects from. Yay!
: Persistent objects made easy. For those of you still saying
More Update: Poo! The mere presence of __getattr__ in a class definition causes the class to run like molasses in January. When I enable __getattr__, time taken to instantiate the class increases by a factor of 250 - even though it is never called! I may have to ask the Python wizards about this.
Err, in theory it should never be called. In practice, it is getting called 2988 times for a single instantiation. Odd, that.
Oh. Using hasattr() within the definition of __getattr__ is a Bad Thing. Access __dict__ directly. Right.
Sushi for you and me.
We've all seen this. I know computers. Not everything about them, but I've dropped out of a Computer Science degree, and on my own time I've studied every relevant topic from solid-state physics to psychology. And the great majority of what is printed in the newspapers regarding computers is, frankly, rubbish. I don't even notice this any more, unless it's a close relative being misquoted (I come from a geeky family) or a particularly obtuse reporter failing to understand anything about the concept of open source. It's what I expect.
I've seen reports on events that I was personally involved in that, if I was lucky, touched on accuracy once or twice within a dozen paragraphs of nonsense. I don't bother to read the paper at all these days. I don't even buy it for the TV guide, since I don't watch TV more than twice a year now that Buffy and Futurama are gone. (That is, I don't watch broadcast TV; I watch plenty of DVDs and downloaded video.)
About the only thing that many newspapers are good for now is to let you know that there
a story, so that you can go and find out the facts yourself.
The cure I found for the Gell-Mann Amnesia Effect was the New York Times. The nonsense they were printing in the first half of last year was so egregious that it became obvious even on subjects I didn't know anything about. Oh, and blogs too.
Read The Whole Thing.
... is just a pig. Since the cat and the rabbit are shinigami (death spirits), one had to wonder about the pig. But no.
.
It will be very interesting to see where it goes from here, because in Magical Girl shows, you just don't
that. (Waiting now for my readers to present innumerable counterexamples.)
Has anyone worked out a classification system for anime series about young girls who long to be idol singers and are suddenly granted the power to turn into teenagers and launched into a successful but traumatic career?
Taking into account such factors as the species of their talking animal companions, whether or not they are dying of cancer, that sort of thing?
Just wondering, that's all.
It's getting as bad as robot maids and schoolgirls falling into parallel universes that only they can save.
A little reading up on DNS and Apache, and now I know how to set up blogs without... Well, without all that tedious mucking about with DNS and Apache.
This will come in handy if I ever need to set up another blog...
. If it was the largest in 100 years, that would mean that some snake was found previously that was even larger.
Anyway, I've seen it on TV. I can't say for sure if it's 15 metres long, but it's one big slithering hisser.
